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Payne v. Cone Mills Corp.: Should A Doctor's Suspicions Bar
A Plaintiff's Meritorious Claim?
Byssinosis, l more commonly referred to as brown lung disease, afflicts
textile workers who are repeatedly exposed to raw cotton dust.2 In North Car-
olina byssinosis is considered an occupational disease.3 A textile worker who
contracts byssinosis is entitled to file a claim for workers' compensation bene-
fits,4 but the claim must be filed within two years5 of the date on which both
prongs of a two-prong test are satisfied. 6 The first prong requires that the
claimant be disabled. The second prong requires that the claimant has been
informed, through a doctor's diagnosis, that his textile job caused or contrib-
uted to his disease. 7 Whether an ambiguous, speculative diagnosis could give
a patient sufficient information to satisfy the notice prong was the central issue
in Payne v. Cone Mills Corp. 8
In Payne the court of appeals held that a claimant, who filed his claim in
1979, had received sufficient notice in 1970 of the occupational nature of his
disease to initiate the two-year limitation period.9 In 1970 Payne's doctor in-
formed him that he "suspected" Payne "might be allergic to some airborne
1. Byssinosis is a disease caused by prolonged exposure to cotton dust with symptoms of
nasal irritation, dry irritating cough, and wheezing respiration of asthmatic character. C. FRAN-
KEL, 5A LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 33.59a, at 82 (rev. ed. 1972).
2. Bouheys, Schoenberg, Beck & Schilling, Epidemiology of Chronic Lung Disease in a Cot-
ton Mill Community, 5 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 607, 616 (Serv-
ice Vol. 1978) (report of study finding excessive chronic lung disease among all types of textile
workers who are exposed to substantial levels of dust including carders, spinners, yarn preparers,
and weavers); Dickie & Chosy, Some Important Occupational Diseases, 3 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE
AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 729, 742 (Service Vol. 1975).
3. See Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369 (1983)
(chronic obstructive lung disease as well as byssinosis compensable occupational disease in North
Carolina); Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 95, 265 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1980).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1979) authorizes compensation for byssinosis:
The following diseases and conditions only shall be deemed to be occupational diseases
within the meaning of this Article ....
(13) Any disease, other than hearing loss covered in another subdivision of this section,
which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and pecu-
liar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases
of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1979) provides:
Disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease described
in G.S. 97-53 shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident within the mean-
ing of the North Carolina Worker's Compensation Act and the procedure and practice
and compensation and other benefits provided by said act shall apply in all such cases
5. Id. § 97-58 (b) & (c). See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
6. Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 712-13, 304 S.E.2d 215, 222 (1983); Taylor
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 98-99, 265 S.E2d 144, 147 (1980).
7. Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 97-99, 265 S.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1980).
8. 60 N.C. App. 692, 299 S.E.2d 847 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 387, 302 S.E.2d 252
(1983).
9. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
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allergen at work."' 0 His claim for disability compensation, fied nine years
after that diagnosis, was barred by expiration of the limitation period. 1 It is
far from certain, however, that the speculative diagnosis Payne received in
1970 was sufficient to apprise him that he had contracted a permanent, disa-
bling, occupational disease, for which he was required to file a claim against
his employer within two years or forego his right to receive compensatory pay-
ment. Although Payne did not receive a conclusive diagnosis of byssinosis
until 1979, the court of appeals held that the earlier, inconclusive diagnosis
was sufficient to begin the limitation period.' 2
The Payne decision reformulates the notice prong of the two-pronged test
established by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Taylor v. JP. Stevens &
Co. 3 Instead of commencing the limitation period on the day the claimant
received actual notice, the Payne decision suggests that a plaintiff must file his
claim when he knew or should have known of the nature and work-related
qualities of his disease. Although the court claimed to have applied the Taylor
rule favoring plaintiff-that a claimant need not file his claim until a doctor
has informed him of the nature and work-related clause of his disease t4-it is
difficult to reach the court's conclusion using the Taylor test. Furthermore,
even if the court intended to follow and apply the Taylor test, the court under-
cut strong policies supporting workers' compensation' 5 in applying the facts to
the test, by evaluating those facts in a light unfavorable to the worker. If
courts follow the Payne approach in similar cases, other claimants may find
their workers' compensation claims barred by the time they learn conclusively
that they are afflicted with a compensable disease.
A better approach, more consistent with the guiding principle of workers'
compensation that "industry '[must] take care of its [own] wreckage,' '"16
would require strict application of Taylor's notice requirement-that the two-
year limitation period does not run until a qualified physician unambiguously
informs the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of his disease.' 7
Moreover, in applying this requirement to specific cases, courts should evalu-
ate the knowledge that each plaintiff actually gained from his diagnosis in
light of all surrounding circumstances, including the plaintiff's education, the
specificity of the diagnosis, and the extent to which workers generally were
aware of the particular occupational hazard at the time the diagnosis was
given. If these guidelines had been followed the Payne court probably would
not have barred plaintiff's claim.
The facts of the Payne case were as follows. Claimant James R. Payne, a
10. Id. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
11. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
12. Id.
13. 300 N.C. 94, 97-99, 265 S.E.2d 144, 147-48 (1980).
14. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
15. See, e.g., Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
16. Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 14,282 S.E.2d 458, 468 (1981) (quoting Barber
v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943)).
17. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 101, 265 S.E.2d at 148.
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cotton mill worker, had received hospital treatment in 1970 for asthmatic
bronchitis secondary to exposure to textile particles. His doctor advised him
not to return to work because he "suspected that he might be allergic to some
airborne allergen at work."' 18 It was not until 1979 that Payne was diagnosed
conclusively as having byssinosis.19 Although the Industrial Commission
ruled that the doctor had not advised Payne of the nature and work-related
cause of his disease in 1970, the court of appeals held that the evidence did not
support this ruling. Therefore, plaintiff's claim was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
20
In making its determination, the court of appeals addressed two ques-
tions: (1) did the court in Taylor correctly construe sections 97-58(b) and 97-
58(c); and (2) given a proper construction, did the Industrial Commission cor-
rectly find the facts? In conclusory language, the court stated that to satisfy
section 97-58 the communication by the physician to the plaintiff must inform
the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of the disease and his result-
ing disability. The court decided that the physician's 1970 diagnosis had satis-
fied the statutory requirements. 2 ' A study of the Payne evidence and the facts
found by the appellate court raises a significant question whether the court
actually applied the test it outlined.
In Taylor, when the North Carolina Supreme Court first instituted the
requirement that the claimant be informed of the nature and work-related
cause of his disease, the court construed ambiguous language in North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 97-58, subsections (b) and (c), by interpreting the
legislature's intent.22 The statute provides:
(b) . ..The time of notice of an occupational disease shall run from
the date that the employee has been advised by competent medical
authority that he has the same.
(c) The right to compensation for occupational disease shall be
barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within
two years after death, disability, or disablement as the case may be.
23
The court reasoned that if a literal interpretation of the language of the statute
contravened the manifest purpose of the statute, the goals behind the statute
should control.24
Construing the statute in this light, the court has held that the time period
begins running upon the occurrence of two events: disability and notice.
First, to be disabled, an employee must have suffered injury from an occupa-
tional disease that renders him incapable of earning the wages he was receiv-
18. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
19. Id. at 695, 299 S.E.2d at 848-49.
20. Id. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850. The plaintiff must establish compliance with the statute's
two-year time limit for the Industrial Commission to have jurisdiction over his claim. See infra
note 29.
21. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
22. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 10 1-02, 265 S.E.2d at 148. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (b) & (c) (1979).
24. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 148-49.
14491984]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing when the incapacitating injury occurred. 25 Second, an employee is
considered "on notice" when he is first advised by a physician that he has the
disease, even though disability may have occurred much earlier.26 Recogniz-
ing that byssinosis is an "insidious" 27 disease with peculiar associated
problems, the Taylor court held that an employee is not informed of his dis-
ease until a physician notifies him of "the nature and work-related quality of
the disease." 28 This standard was designed to reduce the likelihood that una-
ware deserving claimants might lose their compensation rights by passage of
time.
2 9
In 1981 the North Carolina Court of Appeals had two occasions to apply
the Taylor notification standard. In Poythress v. J.P. Stevens and Co. 3 0 plain-
tiff's physician diagnosed her condition as byssinosis resulting from "inhala-
tion of cotton lint fibers leading to a disease of the lung characterized by
foreign body reaction in a febrile but coughing patient. '31 The diagnosis was
made in 1963. As a result of her doctor's diagnosis and recommendation,
claimant retired five months later. She did not file a claim for workers' com-
25. See Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 308 N.C. 701, 709, 304 S.E.2d 215, 220 (1983) (a
worker is incapable of earning wages that he was receiving when he is unable to work as he had in
the past; whether claimant still was able to earn the same hourly wage was not determinative of
the question).
26. Id. at 706, 304 S.E.2d at 218 (1983); Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 149.
27. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 101, 265 S.E.2d at 148.
28. Id., at 102, 265 S.E.2d at 149. See also McCall v. Cone Mills Corp., 61 N.C. App. 118,
122-23, 300 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1983); Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850; McKee v.
Crescent Spinning Co., 54 N.C. App. 558, 561, 284 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1981).
29. Although the courts reduced the likelihood that unsuspecting diseased claimants might
lose their right to receive compensation, the courts heightened the procedural requirements re-
lated to this statute. See Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 398 N.C. 701, 704-05, 304 S.E.2d 215,
218 (1983); Poythress v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 54 N.C. App. 376, 378-79, 283 S.E.2d 573, 576-77
(1981). For example, § 97-58(c) is not considered a statute of limitations to be pleaded and proved
by the defendants. Instead, in Poythress the court of appeals held that the section's two-year time
limit is a condition precedent with which plaintiffs must comply before jurisdiction is conferred on
the Industrial Commission. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 378-79, 283 S.E.2d at 576-77; Dowdy., 308
N.C at 704, 304 S.E.2d at 218. Because the claimant bears the burden of proving that his claim
was filed timely, failure to meet this condition creates an absolute jurisdictional bar. Unlike a
statute of limitations, for which the jurisdictional bar may be waived by the defendant's failure to
raise it, an employer cannot waive the bar caused by the expiration of the workers' compensation
period. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 379, 283 S.E.2d at 577. See also Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 705, 304
S.E.2d at 218 (jurisdiction is challengeable at any time throughout the proceeding).
Since § 97-58(c) creates a condition precedent to establishing the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission, appellate courts must review de novo the evidence supporting an Industrial Com-
mission ruling on whether the claimant filed his claim within the prescribed time period. Lucas v.
Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C.
295, 303-04, 139 S.E.2d 645, 651 (1965). The Industrial Commission's findings of substantive facts
are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1979)
states: "The award of the Industrial Commission. . .shall be conclusive and binding as to all
questions of fact, but either party to the dispute may. . . appeal from the decision of said Com-
mission to the court of appeals for errors of law .... " See also Walston v. Burlington Indus.,
304 N.C. 670, 677, 285 S.E.2d 822, 828 (1981), amended on reh'g, 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822
(1983); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6, 282 S.E.2d 458, 464 (1981). Jurisdictional
facts found by the Industrial Commission are not conclusive on appeal, however, because jurisdic-
tion is a question of law. Higher courts have the power and, indeed, the duty to consider all the
evidence in the record, and make independent findings of jurisdictional facts. Lucas, 289 N.C. at
218, 221 S.E.2d at 261; Richards, 263 N.C. at 303-04, 139 S.E.2d at 651.
30. 54 N.C. App. 376, 283 S.E.2d 573 (1981).
31. Id. at 378, 283 S.E.2d at 575.
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pensation until 1977.32 The court of appeals held that plaintiff had been in-
formed of the nature and work-related cause of her disease in 1963.
33
In McKee v. Crescent Spinning Co. 34 the court of appeals reached the op-
posite result. Claimant, Roy E. McKee, filed his claim in 1978, twelve years
after a doctor informed him that he had "a breathing problem"35 and "if it
doesn't get better soon he had better get out of the mill." 36 Four years after
McKee's first diagnosis, another physician told him that he had "brown lung."
Neither physician, however, further explained the cause of his sickness. Mc-
Kee continued to work in the mill until 1971. 37 The McKee court considered
the recommendation to "get out of the mill" only an admonition, not specific
enough to relay the causation of the breathing problem to claimant. The
"brown lung" diagnosis, which was clearly meaningless to claimant, also
failed to explain the cause of the disease.
38
The Taylor court adopted the "nature and work-related cause" formula-
tion of the notice requirement because it found that the legislature never in-
tended that (1) a plaintiff would have to make a correct medical diagnosis of
his own condition prior to notification from a doctor to make his claim timely,
or that (2) the statutory scheme would be construed to render the time for
notice and filing of the claim inequitably short.39 In the McKee opinion, the
court of appeals noted a third justification for the notice requirement: a plain-
tiff should not be required to inquire further and discover the relationship
between his condition and his employment if his doctor fails to inform him
adequately. 40
The court of appeals' ruling in Payne violated all three of these policies.
By finding that Payne indeed had been informed of the nature and work-re-
32. Id.
33. Id. at 383, 283 S.E.2d at 578.
34. 54 N.C. App. 558, 284 S.E.2d 175 (1981).
35. Id. at 559, 284 S.E.2d at 176.
36. Id. at 562, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
37. Id. at 559, 284 S.E.2d at 176.
38. Id. at 562, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
39. Taylor, 300 N.C. at 102,265 S.E.2d at 149. North Carolina's workers' compensation time
limitation rule is more favorable to plaintiffs than other states' rules. There are six different rules
for determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on a workers' compensation claim.
See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950). Arranged from the most to the least onerous to plaintiffs, the
time limitation period begins to run (1) at the time the negligent act occurred; (2) at the time of the
last industrial exposure; (3) when the disease is contracted; (4) whenever the plaintiff should have
known of the disease's causation; (5) when disability results; and (6) the North Carolina approach,
see supra text accompanying notes 25-29. The numerous philosophies embraced by the states are
a product of their differing statutes and judicial interpretations.
When the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Taylor test instead of a "knew or
should have known" standard, the court placed Norii Carolina among the states lending the most
favorable treatment to workers' compensation plaintiffs stricken with byssinosis. As noted by Tay-
Jor, the "insidious" nature of byssinosis with its peculiar associated problems requires a liberal
reading of § 97-58 to afford plaintiffs their rightful opportunity to file claim. Taylor, 300 N.C. at
97, 265 S.E.2d at 146. By comparison to other states' positions, North Carolina could have pro-
vided more liberal treatment to plaintiffs only by construing § 97-58 as a statute of limitations, cf.
McKinney v. Feldspar Corp., 612 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tenn. 1981) (construing that state's versions of
§ 97-58) instead of a jurisdictional condition precedent.
40. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 563, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
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lated cause of his disease4' when his physician only had advised him that he
"suspected" the disease was connected causally to Payne's occupation,42 the
court of appeals implied that Payne either should have diagnosed his own
condition based on information from which a qualified medical doctor could
only speculate, or should have inquired further about the relationship between
his condition and his employment by seeking a second, more concrete opinion.
By holding that such a vague diagnosis triggered the statutory time period, the
court of appeals rendered the time for filing the claim inequitably short.
43
Implicit in the Payne court's holding is the notion that, in 1970, Payne
knew or should have known from his doctor's diagnosis that he had contracted
a compensable occupational disease. It is, however, not at all certain that
Payne knew anything at all about byssinosis in 1970. Textile workers gener-
ally were poorly educated about the symptoms of byssinosis and their rights to
compensation for occupational disability.44 It was not until 1980, ten years
after Payne's diagnosis, that a widely read North Carolina newspaper publi-
cized the problem of byssinosis.45 If the Payne court had considered claim-
ant's probable lack of knowledge about the disease in 1970, it is doubtful that
it would have found his doctor's speculative diagnosis to be sufficient notifica-
tion to start the running of the statutory time period.
In two other cases decided later in 1983, North Carolina courts again held
that the Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims
because more than two years had elapsed since the plaintiffs were informed of
the nature and work-related cause of their diseases. The facts in these cases,
McCall v. Cone Mills, Inc. 46 and Dowdy v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. ,47 however,
strongly indicated that the plaintiffs actually had received notice, as required
in section 97-58, of their occupational diseases. The McCall case was decided
just one month after the court of appeals rendered the Payne decision. In that
case claimant's decedent, Martin McCall, had been diagnosed as suffering
from "allergic pneumonitis due to exposure to cotton fibers and hypertensive
vascular disease."'48 The record was unclear whether his doctor told him that
he had byssinosis.49 Shortly after discharge from the hospital, decedent re-
tired, in part because his physician had informed him that "his lungs were full
of lint" and it's "going to kill you."' 50 From this evidence, the McCall court
found that decedent had been informed sufficiently of his disease, its nature,
41. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 698, 299 S.E.2d at 850.
42. Id. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
43. But see Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 375, 283 S.E.2d at 579 (A claimant has no right to be
told that he has a claim for workers' compensation; he need be told only the nature and work-
related aspect of his disease for the two-year time limit to begin to run.).
44. See Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 381, 283 S.E.2d at 579.
45. See Brown Lung: A Case of Deadly Neglect, The Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3-10, 1980
(byssinosis series). This Pulitzer Prize winning feature documented the varied aspects of byssi-
nosis for the paper's approximately 170,000 readers.
46. 61 N.C. App. 118, 300 S.E.2d 245 (1983).
47. 308 N.C. 70, 304 S.E.2d 215 (1983).
48. McCall, 61 N.C. App. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
49. Id. at 120-21, 300 S.E.2d at 246-47.
50. Id. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
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and its relation to his work to begin the running of the two-year time limit.5 '
Five months after the Payne case, the North Carolina Supreme Court
reviewed the same time-limit jurisdiction issue in Dowdy.52 Like McCall,
Dowdy presented much stronger evidence supporting the expiration of the
two-year limit than Payne. Five years before Dowdy filed his claim for work-
ers' compensation, his doctor informed him that he was "severely disabled and
he should not be exposed any further to airborne irritants namely cigarette
smoke and industrial dust."53 The examining doctor also stated that the "im-
pairment isprobaby due in part to the cotton dust exposure in spite of the fact
that the diagnosis of byssinosis is not warranted in view of the only occasional
occurrence of complaints in relation to cotton dust exposure."'54 The doctor
found that Dowdy, a cigarette smoker, had chronic obstructive lung disease
with distinct aggravation by cotton dust exposure.55 He encouraged Dowdy to
refrain from smoking and avoid exposure to cotton dust.5 6 On this evidence,
the court held that Dowdy had been informed by a medical authority of his
occupational disease, its nature, and its relation to his employment. Appar-
ently, when Dowdy's doctor told him that his disease "severely restricted his
ability to breath," he was informed of the nature of the disease. By relating
the disease "to cotton dust in [Dowdy's] work envirvonment at the defendant's
mill," the doctor was deemed to have informed Dowdy of the work-related
cause.57 Although chronic obstructive lung disease was not recognized as a
compensable disease in 1973, 58 that fact was irrelevant for section 97-58
purposes.5
9
The Taylor court may have intended its two-pronged test to establish a
bright-line standard that would require all questions of doubtful notification
to be resolved in the claimant's favor.60 If that was the court's intention, it has
been obscured by the holdings of Poythress, McKee, McCall, Dowdy, and
Payne. These five cases do not fall on one side or the other of a bright-line
51. Id. at 122-23, 300 S.E.2d at 247.
52. 308 N.C. at 701, 304 S.E.2d at 215.
53. Id. at 707, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 706, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
57. Id. at 712-13, 304 S.E.2d at 222.
58. See Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369 (1983)
(chronic obstructive lung disease recognized as a compensable occupational disease under certain
circumstances); Note, Workers' Compensation-Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam: Leaving
Precedent in the Dust?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 573 (1984).
59. Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 380, 283 S.E.2d at 576.
60. Although § 97-58 is a condition precedent to obtaining jurisdiction, Poythress, 54 N.C.
App. at 375-79, 283 S.E.2d at 576-77; Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 704,304 S.E.2d at 218; see supra note 29,
it closely resembles a statute of limitations in its purpose. See Lunkin v. Triangle Farm, Inc., 208
La. 538, 543, 23 So. 2d 209, 210 (1945) (discussing purposes of a workers' compensation statute of
limitations). The North Carolina Supreme Court has cautioned that "'the statute of limitations
... is not such a meritorious defense that [judicial interpretation] should be strained in aid of
it.' Hardbarger v. Deal, 258 N.C. 31, 35, 127 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1962) (quoting Rochester v. Tub,
54 Wash. 2d 71, 74, 337 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1959)). By analogy, courts should not stretch facts
unnecessarily in defendant's favor to find that the two-year time limit prescribed by § 97-58 has
expired.
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standard, but may be arranged more appropriately along a continuum of fact
situations-ranging from those with facts clearly showing that the plaintiff had
received notice sufficient to satisfy the Taylor test to those with facts demon-
strating that the plaintiff had received no diagnosis that triggered the running
of the statute. McCall and Poythress may be placed together at one end of the
continuum because they both exemplify situations in which plaintiff clearly
received the notice mandated by Taylor; both claimants received affirmative
diagnoses that their diseases were caused by cotton lint.61 McKee appears at
the other end of the continuum because its facts show that plaintiff did not
receive adequate Taylor notice. A doctor advised McKee to leave the mill
only if his condition failed to improve, but did not even speculate about the
cause of the disease. 62 From this, McKee could draw only a vague inference
that his mill work either aggravated or contributed to his already well-devel-
oped disease. The Dowdy facts fall between these two ends, closer to the no-
tice end. The diagnosis that Dowdy's condition was "probably" due to cotton
dust63 indicated that the doctor offered his opinion within a reasonable degree
of medical certainty. Given the very nature of the disease, affirmative diagno-
sis often is difficult.64 Thus, this diagnosis was sufficient to notify a plaintiff
according to the Taylor guidelines.
The Payne facts fall somewhere between the notice in Dowdy and the lack
of notice in McKee. Dowdy was told that his disease was "probably" caused
by cotton dust;65 Payne's physician only "suspected" that his breathing
problems resulted from agents in the mill environment. 66 The court of appeals
implied that Payne knew or should have known from this diagnosis that he
had an occupational disease. 67 McKee, on the other hand, did not have even
the benefit of speculation as to the cause of his disease.
68
By implicitly holding Payne to a "knew or should have known" standard
of notification, the Payne court transformed section 97-58 from a claimant-
favorable statute, as construed by the Taylor and McKee courts, to a defend-
ant-favorable statute. Payne permitted a speculative diagnosis, rendered at a
time when public awareness of the byssinosis problem was minimal, to satisfy
the Taylor rule. The holding in Payne circumvented the purpose of the statute
by causing the time limit to run before claimant received actual notification of
the nature and cause of his disease.
Payne's departure from the Taylor approach should not be followed and
should be disapproved by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In future cases
the North Carolina appellate courts should hold that the two-year limitation
61. McCall, 61 N.C. App. at 120-23, 300 S.E.2d at 246-47; Poythress, 54 N.C. App. at 378,
283 S.E.2d at 575.
62. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 561-62, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
63. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 707, 304 S.E.2d at 219.
64. See Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 640, 256 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1979).
65. Dowdy, 308 N.C. at 708, 304 S.E.2d at 221.
66. Payne, 60 N.C. App. at 696, 299 S.E.2d at 849.
67. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
68. McKee, 54 N.C. App. at 561, 284 S.E.2d at 178.
1454 [Vol. 62
1984] WORKERS' COMPENSA TION 1455
period does not begin to run until a qualified physician unambiguously informs
the plaintiff of the nature and work-related cause of his disease. In each case,
the question whether the claimant was adequately informed about his disease
should be answered with reference to the plaintiffs individual knowledge and
the overall public awareness of the occupational disease at the time of the
diagnosis. Courts should guard against any construction of section 97-58 that
would permit the time limit to run before the claimant receives meaningful
notification of the nature and cause of his disease.
TAMARA PATTERSON BARRINGER
